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Abstract. In this essay I seek to critically evaluate some forms of holism 
and organicism in biological thought, as a more deflationary echo to Gilbert 
and Sarkar’s reflection on the need for an ‘umbrella’ concept to convey the 
new vitality of holistic concepts in biology (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000). Given 
that some recent discussions in theoretical biology call for an organism concept 
(from Moreno and Mossio’s work on organization to Kirschner et al.’s 
research paper in Cell, 2000, building on chemistry to articulate what they 
called “molecular vitalism,” studying the “vitalistic” properties of molecular, 
cellular, and organismal function, and Pepper and Herron’s suggestion in 
their 2008 paper that organisms define a category that evolutionary biology 
cannot do without), the question, what concept of organicism are they calling 
for? To what extent are such claims philosophically committed to a non-
naturalistic concept of organism as organizing centre, as a foundational rather 
than heuristic concept – or possibly a “biochauvinism,” to use Di Paolo’s 
term (Di Paolo 2009)? My aim in this paper is to conceptually clarify the 
forms of holism and organicism that are involved in these cases (and I 
acknowledge that the study of early 20th-century holisms [Peterson 2010] 
indicates that not all of them were in fact ‘organicist’ or ‘biologistic’). I suggest 
that contemporary holists are still potentially beholden to a certain kind of 
vitalism or “biochauvinism”; but that when they reduce their claims to mere 
heuristics, conversely, they risk losing sight of a certain kind of organizational 
“thickness”, a “vital materiality” (Wheeler 2010) which is characteristic of 
biological systems (Bechtel 2007). And I ask if it is possible to articulate a 
concept of biological holism or organicism which is neither an empirical 
‘biochauvinism’ nor a metaphysical ‘vitalism’? 
 
 
I. A question sometimes asked in recent reflections at the in-
tersection of the philosophy of biology and so-called ‘historical 
epistemology’ is, do organisms have an ontological status? Now, 
we should note immediately that there are at least two very differ-
ent ways to answer this question in the affirmative. One is more 
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philosophical, and seeks to provide criteria, e.g. of individuals 
which organisms instantiate particularly well; from Aristotle to 
Hegel and Jonas, this can be termed a strong holist option, but let 
us again stress, in a philosophical context, for as we shall see, it is 
possible to defend a holist claim for the ontological uniqueness of 
organisms, on a biological basis as well (to be clear, I do not have 
in mind a distinction between ‘metaphysical’ and ‘experimental’ 
here). A philosophical defense of strong holism as regards biolog-
ical individuals will tend to be more stipulative, appealing for 
instance to the nature of whole/part relations and insisting that in 
organisms, there is a special type of interrelation between parts. 
In contrast, strong holism of the biological sort will typically 
appeal to the empirical criteria defining actual organisms – but 
which criteria?, would be the immediate retort, pointing to the 
lack of any unifying concept for the diversity of actual organisms, 
from drosophila to the Portuguese man-o-war1. 
There are also diverse answers of the negative variety, which 
I will be less interested in here. They include a kind of absolute 
physicalism, which is more of an intellectual vue de l’esprit than a 
position actually encountered amongst most working natural 
philosophers: on this view, what is real is the entities specified in 
fundamental physics, and since organisms do not belong to this 
class of entities (however much some former physicists struggled 
in the 1960s to find ‘organismic laws’, like Walter Elsasser2), they 
can have nothing other than a ‘folk’, ‘cultural’ or perhaps ‘psycho-
logical’ status. More common is a general dismissal of the very 
question, in the favor of a kind of evolving, instrumentalist con-
sensus, according to which there is no point in debating the 
ultimate reality or ontological status of organisms, since what 
matters is the theoretical terms science uses in its work, and these 
constantly evolve (thus ‘organism’ gave way to ‘gene’, but even 
‘gene’ now seems like a construct, since it can no longer be 
 
1 J. PEPPER, M HERRON, Does biology need an organism concept? «Biological Re-
views», 83, 2008, pp. 621–627. 
2 W.M. ELSASSER, Quanta and the concept of organismic law, «Journal of Theoretical 
Biology», 1 (1), 1961, pp. 27-58 ; Reflections on a Theory of Organisms. Holism in 
Biology, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998. 
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thought of as «an inherently stable, discrete stretch of DNA that 
encodes information for producing a protein», which is copied 
faithfully before being passed on; rather, we now know that 
«stability lies in the system as a whole, not in the gene»3).  
Closer to my general interests, although I will not explore 
this option here, is a more ‘historicized’ approach, in which the 
reality of organisms is neither bluntly asserted – as is predomi-
nant in theoretical biology and most Continental ‘biophilosophy’4 
– or denied, in favor of atoms, molecules, or selfish genes. In-
stead, it is examined in a diversity of historical régimes, contexts, 
sometimes with an increased focus on the nature of the experi-
mental scientific apparatus involved. For instance, Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger describes experimental systems while emphasizing a 
cognitive, constructed level of the effectivity of scientific practic-
es: experimental systems do not just inhabit a world of ‘things’ 
but also, what he calls «graphematic spaces», capable of «differen-
tial reproduction»5. Thus for our purposes, the reality of organ-
isms for an embryologist in the school of Wilhelm Roux is not 
the same, e.g., as that experienced by an eighteenth-century 
Montpellier medical vitalist insisting on the difference between 
medical mechanistic models of the body and the ‘animal econo-
 
3 E. JABLONKA, M.J. LAMB, Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, 
Behavioral and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2005, p. 7. 
4 ‘Biophilosophy’ is a term that was popular in the post-war decades in French 
‘épistémologie’ (and to some extent also in the German versions, where 
authors like Kant and/or Hegel played a greater role, e.g. Gerhard Vollmer). It 
was often presented as not being guilty of the reductionist excesses of analyti-
cally oriented ‘philosophy of biology’. My interest here is not to choose be-
tween the two but to judge the claims of certain forms of biological holism. 
On the emergence of philosophy of biology as a discipline in contrast to 
‘biophilosophy’ see J. GAYON, La philosophie et la biologie, in Encyclopédie 
philosophique universelle, vol. IV, ed. J.-F. Mattéi, PUF, Paris, 1998, pp. 2152-
2171, which he has reprised with the more specific focus of ‘vitalism’ in his 
Vitalisme et philosophie de la biologie, in Repenser le vitalisme, ed. P. Nouvel, 
PUF, Paris, 2011, pp. 15-31. 
5 H.J. RHEINBERGER, Experimental Systems – Graphematic Spaces, in T. LENOIR, 
(ed.), Inscribing science: scientific texts and the materiality of communication, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 287. Thanks to Claudia Manta for suggest-
ing this reference. 
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my’ (a term often used in that period to describe the functionally 
interdependent, physiological system of the body, as distinct from 
the mere machine). Curiously, both friends and foes of ho-
lism/organicism6 ignore the potential resources the historical 
view would afford them, being content instead to assert or deny 
an ontological state of affairs. 
Here I will not pursue this more historical route, as I shall be 
concerned with some varieties of biological holism, mainly in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which I will seek to evaluate, 
primarily in the form of a brief internal critique. To be clear, I am 
not arguing for one sharply delimited ‘reductionist’ or ‘holist’ 
position, but rather, I am evaluating some of the tensions or 
excessive commitments carried by various forms of holism, in 
order to see what can be saved therein. My goal is to assess a 
potential legitimacy of a certain kind of holism or organicism, 
which, I shall suggest, needs to steer clear of a variety of wrong-
headed, anti-naturalistic or otherwise excessively falsifiable an-
swers to the initial question. To borrow an expression from 
Daniel Dennett, the issue is: which varieties of organicism are ‘worth 
wanting’? Since Scott Gilbert and Sahotra Sarkar’s reflection on 
the need for an ‘umbrella’ or ‘organizing’ concept to convey the 
new vitality of systemic or holistic concepts in biology7, seconded 
by Manfred Laubichler’s paper proclaiming the return of the 
‘organism’ as such an organizing concept8, some scholarly work 
has been done which dispels earlier prejudices and gives us a 
more useful, nuanced sense both of these concepts in biological 
science and their possible pertinence today9.  
 
6 I’ll refrain from using the potentially convenient two-letter acronym. 
7 S. GILBERT, S. SARKAR, Embracing complexity: organicism for the 21st century, 
«Developmental Dynamics», 219, 2000, pp. 1-9. 
8 M. LAUBICHLER, The Organism is dead. Long live the organism! «Perspectives on 
Science», 8 (3), 2000, pp. 286-315. 
9 See e.g. P. HUNEMAN, C.T. WOLFE (eds.), The Concept of Organism: Historical, 
Philosophical, Scientific Perspectives, special issue of History and Philosophy of the Life 
Sciences, 32 (2-3), 2010 and T. CHEUNG, From the Organism of a Body to the Body of 
an Organism: occurrence and meaning of the word ‘organism’ from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries, «British Journal of the History of Science», 39, 2006, 319-
339, on the history and theory of organism. 
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In addition, there has been some sustained work on these 
concepts in current biology. To name three recent examples, (1) in 
theoretical biology, the effort to articulate a model of «organized 
systems» and «organizational closure», in Alvaro Moreno and 
Matteo Mossio’s research, alone or with collaborators10. A question 
arising in reaction to this research is the extent to which philosoph-
ically it is committed to a non-naturalistic concept of organism as 
organizing centre, as a foundational rather than heuristic concept – 
or possibly a «biochauvinism», to use Di Paolo’s term11. He does 
not define it, but we can imagine that biochauvinism would be the 
present-day, naturalistic form of what was attacked by the Vienna 
Circle and others as vitalism: no longer the claim that there are 
immaterial vital forces which play a causal role in the functioning 
of living beings, but simply the claim that living beings, as distinct 
from tables, chairs and protons, are ontologically specific, not to 
say special. This is not an essay devoted to the work of Moreno et 
al. but I will state right away that I find their work especially free of 
these more inflated metaphysical claims that are characteristic of 
other, comparable theorists (including Francisco Varela, Robert 
Rosen and Evan Thompson). 
(2) In biochemistry, Kirschner et al.’s research paper in Cell 
(Kirschner et al. 2000) on what they called «molecular vitalism»: they 
suggested that, faced with the limitations of genomics, researchers 
should investigate what the authors «whimsically» termed the «vital-
istic» properties of molecular, cellular, and organismal function: «the 
organism has fashioned a very stable physiology and embryology 
[…] It is this robustness that suggested ʻvital forcesʼ, and it is this 
robustness that we wish ultimately to understand in terms of chem-
istry. We will have such an opportunity in this new century»12. 
 
10 M. MOSSIO, A MORENO, Organisational closure in biological organisms, «History 
and Philosophy of the Life Sciences», 32(2-3), 2010, pp. 269-288; A MORENO, 
M. MOSSIO, Biological autonomy. A Philosophical and theoretical enquiry, Springer, 
Dordrecht, forthcoming, and earlier, K. RUIZ-MIRAZO, A ETXEBERRIA, A 
MORENO, J. IBÁÑEZ, Organisms and their place in biology, «Theory Bioscience», 
119, 2000, pp. 209-233. 
11 E. DI PAOLO, Extended Life, «Topoi», 28, 2009, p. 10. 
12 M. KIRSCHNER, J GERHART, T. MITCHISON, Molecular “Vitalism”, «Cell», 100, 
2000, p. 87.  
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(3) In evolutionary biology, Pepper and Herron’s 2008 paper 
suggests that organisms define a category that evolutionary biolo-
gy cannot do without, because it «relies heavily on the compara-
tive method, and effective comparison requires that we first 
define a class of comparable entities», and they seek to articulate a 
«robust and general operational definition» of organism, which 
should distinguish between «which biological entities are organ-
isms and which are not», particularly from parts of organisms and 
groups of organisms13. 
The above examples indicate that different trends in biologi-
cal theory are articulating – or calling for – an organism concept. 
However, only the first of these three cases directly contributes to 
an explicitly holistic and organismic framework, which is the main 
focus of this essay.  
My aim is to conceptually clarify these forms of holism and 
organicism. I acknowledge that the study of early twentieth-
century holisms indicates that not all of them were in fact ‘organ-
icist’ or ‘biologistic’. That is, some of the original forms of self-
described holism (I am not speaking of purported holists who 
include such diverse figures as Spinoza, Hegel and Whitehead) 
were primarily interested in systems as such, although they waver 
on the issue, sometimes even seeking to derive principles from 
biological systems for the understanding of other systems, as in 
Walter Cannon’s suggestion that  
 
It seems not impossible that the means employed by the more 
highly evolved animals for preserving uniform and stable their 
internal economy (i.e., for preserving homeostasis) may present 
some general principles for the establishment, regulation and 
control of steady states, that would be suggestive for other kinds 
of organization—even social and industrial—which suffer from 
distressing perturbations14. 
 
13 J. PEPPER, M. HERRON, Does biology need an organism concept?, pp. 625, 621. For 
more on the issue of ‘what units do biologists count?’ see the original article by 
E. CLARKE, The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals, «The Journal of 
Philosophy», CX (8), 2013, pp. 413-435. 
14 W.B. CANNON, The Wisdom of the Body (1932), revised and expanded edition, 
Norton, New York, 1963, p. 25 (thanks to Yelda Nasifoglu for help with this 
reference). 
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What is holism? As mentioned above, it is intimately bound 
up with systems theory, and with formally driven methods which 
sought to give a new kind of coherence to biology, although this 
‘systems’ interest was not always specifically biological. The 
person often presented as the first theorist of holism, the South 
African segregationist statesman (and specialist of Walt Whitman) 
Jan Christiaan Smuts, as well as John von Neumann and Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy later, wavers between defining holism as a total 
systemic standpoint (with no particular reference to a special 
status for living entities) and holism as an approach or model 
which sheds particular light on embryology and how organisms 
are not mere machines (with reference to teleology and the “his-
torical” or “learned” character of organisms).  
Deliberately or inadvertently mirroring various other epi-
sodes in the history of mechanistic and organismic theories (in-
cluding the Leibniz-Stahl debate), these original holists also speci-
fy abstract terms on which ʻmerely mechanical aggregatesʼ are 
different from genuine wholes, including chemical compounds, 
and then specify that biological organisms are the exemplars of 
ʻcreative wholesʼ, as Smuts calls them, i.e., wholes which create 
structures different from their constituents or parts15. Here I will 
not be concerned with holism as a general systems theory, but 
rather with holism/organicism as a claim to define what is unique 
in biological systems, i.e., a kind of biochauvinism. 
 
 
II. Two critical remarks on two strangely apposite pitfalls of 
holist-organicist theory:  
(1) One notices a strange appeal of Kantianism for these 
schools of thought, notably Varela’s16. There is something deeply 
 
15 J.C. SMUTS, Holism and Evolution (1926), Sherman Oaks, CA, Sierra Sunrise 
Books, 1999, pp. 140–141. The best general analysis and reconstruction of 
holism and organicism in early twentieth-century biological thought is E. 
PETERSONS’ dissertation, Finding Mind, Form, Organism, and Person in a Reduction-
ist Age, PhD, 2 vols., Program in History and Philosophy of Science, University 
of Notre Dame, 2010. 
16 Instances of such confusions can be found in A. WEBER, F.J. VARELA, Life 
after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. 
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flawed in a procedure which invokes the authority of the Kantian 
‘projective’ approach to organisms17 in order to assert a set of 
ontological specificities about organisms. First, because this is 
precisely what the Kantian regulative ideal concept was designed 
to avoid, in explicit contrast to what he would have called ‘ration-
al metaphysics’. To provide an empirical set of criteria for why 
living beings are special and to claim that this supports or is 
supported by a Kantian framework, is not a good idea if this 
framework explicitly rejects the idea of giving empirical defini-
tions of organism, inasmuch as Kant’s organism concept is ex-
plicitly built around his notion of regulative ideal18. For Kant, 
organism is a «reflective» construct rather than a «constitutive» 
feature of reality, and reflective judgments are «incapable of 
justifying any objective assertions»19. 
Second, because it is not clear in any case why it counts as an 
argument against ‘mechanistic science’ or ‘reductionism’ to simply 
produce a list of key definitory features of Life, most classically, 
self-preservation, self-reproduction, self-reparation, and self-
regulation20, or in a more updated form, «reproduction, life-
cycles, genetics, sex, developmental bottlenecks, germ-soma 
separation, policing mechanisms, spatial boundaries or contiguity, 
immune response, fitness maximization, cooperation and/or 
conflict, codispersal, adaptations, metabolic autonomy, and func-
tional integration»21 (but precisely, the list is neither absolute nor 
stable, which is why many thinkers, including prominent biolo-
 
«Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences», 1, 2002, pp. 97-125; S. 
KAUFFMAN, G. LONGO, No Law Entails The Evolution Of The Bio-
sphere, 2011, http://lifeboat.com/blog/2011/07/no-law-entails-the-evolution 
-of-the-biosphere; G. LONGO, M. MONTÉVIL, S. KAUFMAN, No entailing laws, 
but enablement in the evolution of the biosphere, 2012,  http://arxiv.org/pdf/ 
1201.2069.pdf  
17 P. HUNEMAN (ed.), Understanding Purpose: Collected Essays on Kant and the 
Philosophy of Biology, University of Rochester Press, North American Kant 
Society Publication Series, Rochester, 2007. 
18 I. KANT, Critique of Judgment (1790), tr. W. Pluhar, Hackett, Indianapolis, 
1987, § 73, p. 276. 
19 I. KANT, Critique of Judgment, § 67, p. 259; § 73, p. 277. 
20 Cf. J. SCHLANGER, Les métaphores de l’organisme, Vrin, Paris, 1971, p. 14. 
21 E. CLARKE, The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals, cit., p. 415. 
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gists, have declared that «Life as such does not exist»22), including 
because mechanistic explanations have shown themselves to be 
far more flexible and capable of integrating inter-level relations 
than the depiction of them as taking apart systems into compo-
nent parts and leaving them there like broken toys.  
Another puzzling feature of these projects in theoretical bi-
ology that invoke Kant but primarily seek to defend versions of 
self-organization, might be expressed as: why the need for phi-
losophy? Why run the risk of lapsing into a kind of naïve, indeed 
precritical metaphysics of selfhood and interiority, or of anti-
materialism? How could a working natural scientist take on board 
proclamations such as Thompson’s: «Life is not physical in the 
standard materialist sense of purely external structure and func-
tion. Life realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of selfhood 
and sense-making. We accordingly need an expanded notion of 
the physical to account for the organism or living being»23? This 
opposition between materialism and interiority is reminiscent of 
post-Kantian denunciations of attempts to find the ʻseat of the 
soulʼ. Further, here Thompson is calling for an expanded notion 
of the physical, but often these kinds of theories, as I discuss 
below, end up explicitly recommending that we disregard materi-
ality altogether – ironically given the desire on the part of, e.g., 
developmental systems theorists to move away from a disembod-
ied understanding of biological information, towards a kind of 
vital materiality. More generally, if theoretical biology wants 
organizational concepts, seeks to steer our attention away from 
the sirens of genetic reductionism and the informational gene, 
why should this entail being anti-materialists?) And I’ve noted 
elsewhere24 that I think the appeal of Moreno, Mossio et al. is that 
 
22 A. SZENT-GYÖRGI, The Living State: With Observations on Cancer, Academic 
Press, New York, 1972, p. 1 (thanks to Gil C. Santos for this reference). 
23 E. THOMPSON, Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind, Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2007, p. 238. Would Thompson also 
endorse Hegel’s assertion that « The spatiality of the organism has no truth 
whatsoever for the soul » (G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. 
Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970, § 248Z, p. 18)? 
24 C.T. WOLFE, Do organisms have an ontological status?, «History and Philosophy 
of the Life Sciences», 32 (2-3), 2010, pp. 195-232. 
 Charles T. Wolfe Articles 48 
they dispense with the somewhat foundationalist metaphysical 
appeals of these other forms of holism. 
(2) the problem of seeking to justifying the autonomy and/or 
ontological uniqueness of Life, organisms, biological agents in 
terms of empirical criteria, of a laundry list of properties of Life (from 
the classic, self-preservation, self-reproduction, etc. as mentioned 
above, to organizational closure, autonomy and so on).25 As I 
wrote a few years ago, one thinker’s homeostasis will always end 
up being another thinker’s homeostat26; or, one theorist’s dynam-
ic equilibrium of hearts, kidneys, termite mounds or chemotaxis 
will always end up being another theorist’s dynamic equilibrium 
of storms or traffic jams. Not that all attempts to understand 
such systems have to fall prey to the problems of a foundational 
or otherwise ontologized empirical set of core criteria for Life: 
Moreno and Mossio do not, as noted, and speaking of termite 
mounds, when Turner presents them as a case of «embodied 
homeostasis»27, he avoids these pitfalls since he does not ontologize 
the property. The interaction between individual termites, and 
between the termites and the termite mound, is a form of organi-
zation rather than a special substance, a point made brilliantly by the 
systems theorist von Bertalanffy: 
 
Organisms exhibit the properties of life not because of some 
special peculiarity of these compounds, but on account of the 
heterogeneous system into which these compounds are articu-
lated. There is no “living substance” because the characteristic 
of life is the organization of substances28. 
 
I note in passing, because that is a topic for a different paper, 
 
25 For a more detailed, and sophisticated attempt to delineate a set of features 
of ‘biological autonomy’, see B. ROSSLENBROICH, On the Origin of Autonomy – A 
new look at the major transitions in evolution, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. 
26 That is, one thinker’s purportedly core biological feature can be artificially 
modeled by another. C.T. WOLFE, Do organisms have an ontological status?. Thanks 
to Olivier Surel for suggesting I clarify this. 
27 J.S. TURNER, The Tinkerer’s Accomplice: How Design Emerges From Life Itself, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2007, p. 27. 
28 L.V. BERTALLANFY, Modern theories of development, trans. J.H. Woodger, 
Oxford University Press, H. Milford, London, 1933, p. 48. 
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that one worthwhile holist-organicist strategy that does not invoke 
definitional properties of life (or barely), is Kurt Goldstein’s, in 
his suggestion that rather than say what is unique about the bio-
logical, we look to the observer: to be an organism is to have a point 
of view on organisms; one which produces intelligibility, which 
reveals organisms as meaning-producing beings29. This approach 
– which has Kantian antecedents – is further extended after 
Goldstein, by Georges Canguilhem. 
Either way, waving lists of properties is a poor way to coun-
ter the power of reductionism. The reductionist can always reply, 
in Pierre Duhem’s words, that a body is «only provisionally simple; 
it has remained undecomposed until now, but tomorrow may 
yield to a new means of analysis»30.  
 
 
III. Holism or organicism, if it seeks to ontologize or other-
wise absolutize features of life (digestion, proprioception, inten-
tionality …) can run into some categorical problems, that is, 
category mistakes, but also the danger of making empirical claims 
to have identified absolute traits of life – à la Elsasser’s organis-
mic laws, or Varela’s «autopoiesis is an explication of the auton-
omy of the living»31, or Thompson’s statement of what we might 
call the vulgate of biological holism, «parts arise from the whole. 
Part and whole co-emerge and mutually specify each other»32, 
itself not really an argument – which may in the end go up in 
smoke, when it emerges that scientists cannot agree on a defini-
tion of life, and thus find it more helpful to eliminate the concept. 
If the concept of Life is rejected, as in Albert Szent-György’s 
«Life as such does not exist» or better-known, the partly per-
 
29 J. STAROBINSKI, L’idée d’organisme, Centre de Documentation Universi-
taire/Collège philosophique, Paris, 1956. The field of biosemiotics tarries at 
the limit between this flexible, non-literal idea of organisms as meaning-makers 
or world-makers, and a more stubbornly literal program. 
30 P. DUHEM Le mixte et la combinaison chimique. Essai sur l’évolution d’une idée 
(1902); reprint, Fayard-Corpus, Paris 1985, p. 50. 
31 F. VARELA, Autonomy and Autopoiesis, in G. Roth and H. Schwegler, eds., Self-
Organizing Systems, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt 1981, p. 14. 
32 E. THOMPSON, Mind in life, cit., p. 38. 
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formative statement by François Jacob, «On n’interroge plus la 
vie aujourd’hui dans les laboratoires»33, claims to have found its 
essential characteristics lose their foundation. 
Further, sometimes the (former and current) holist and or-
ganicist insistence on opposing the systems they lovingly study to 
some apparently inferior opposed entity, whether matter itself, 
machines, corpses or the dehumanized world of Scientific Revo-
lution science, starts to sound ideological rather than scientific or 
philosophically exploratory, even when it is put in deceptively 
plain terms, such as here in Alva Noë’s recent book Out of our 
heads: «to do biology we need the resources to take up a non-
mechanistic attitude to the organism»34. What would the mecha-
nistic attitude be? That of Descartes (who wrote, «the preserva-
tion of health has always been the principal end of my studies»35)? 
Of Claude Bernard (for whom «what distinguishes a living ma-
chine is not the nature of its physico-chemical properties, com-
plex as they may be, but rather the creation of the machine which 
develops under our eyes in conditions proper to itself and accord-
ing to a definite idea which expresses the living being’s nature and 
the very essence of life»36)? Of the contemporary ‘mechanist’ 
William Bechtel, for whom mechanism and organization stand in 
a complex and fruitful interaction? Mechanism, Bechtel suggests, 
can provide an adequate account of organization by «placing as 
much emphasis on understanding the particular ways in which 
biological mechanisms are organized as it has on discovering the 
 
33 F. JACOB, La logique du vivant, Gallimard, Paris, 1970, p. 320. See the inte-
resting reflections on this issue in Michel Morange’s review essay M. MO-
RANGE Un retour du vitalisme?, Histoire de la recherche contemporaine 2(2), 
2013, pp. 150-155). 
34 A. NOË, Out of Our Heads; Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from 
the Biology of Consciousness, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2009, p. 41. 
35 In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, October 1645, in R. DESCARTES, 
Œuvres, eds. C. Adam and P. Tannery, 11 vols., Vrin, Paris 1964-1976, vol. IV, 
p. 329; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3: The correspondence, trans. J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 275. 
36 C. BERNARD, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865), Henry 
Schuman, New York, 1927, p. 93. 
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component parts of the mechanisms and their operations»37. But 
this does not reduce to some pure mechanist ontology. In fact, 
the holist/organicist standpoint minimally «remind[s] mechanists 
of the shortfalls of the mechanistic accounts on offer», for ideas 
such as «negative feedback, self-organizing positive feedback, and 
cyclic organization are critical to explaining the phenomena 
exhibited by living organism»38. 
I say sometimes, since biochauvinism, or some weaker form of 
it, need not be so ideological or oppositional. When it is not, it 
can be appealing as a stubbornly realist or materialist-friendly 
emphasis on genuine biological constraints. Consider the (some-
what restrictive) opposition Andy Clark proposes, between two 
arguments for embodiment (and here for ‘embodiment’ we could 
substitute ‘biochauvinism’, ‘organismicity’, etc.):  
 
One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine 
details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the 
nature of its mind: a kind of new-wave body-centrism. The oth-
er depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal-
partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature 
of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of 
extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for 
multiple realizability than ever before)39. 
  
I daresay most materialists except ones especially enamored 
of pure physics would want to say that «the fine details of a crea-
ture’s embodiment» count as «a major constraint on the nature of 
its mind»; yet these fine details by no means imply that «the body 
is special» in any way, especially not that of an embodied or 
enactivist phenomenology founding itself on a claim of a founda-
tional interiority – recall, again, Thompson’s «Life is not physical 
in the standard materialist sense of purely external structure and 
function. Life realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of 
 
37 W. BECHTEL, Biological mechanisms: Organized to maintain autonomy, in F. 
BOOGERD, F.J. BRUGGEMAN, J.-H.S. HOFMEYER, AND H.V. WESTERHOFF 
(eds.), Systems Biology: Philosophical Foundations, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 270. 
38 Ivi, pp. 296-297. 
39 A. CLARCK, Pressing the flesh: a tension in the study of the embodied embedded mind ?, 
Philos. Phenomenol. Res., 76 (1), 2008, p. 56. 
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selfhood and sense-making», to which we can add Varela’s claim 
in a late paper that his project is to «reintroduce the subject into 
biology»40. Now, I am not rejecting as anti-naturalistic the latter 
part of Thompson’s claim – namely, that organisms are engaged 
in ‘sense-making’, an idea we could fill in either ‘biosemiotically’ 
(with Uexküll’s analysis of Umwelt, in which «even the simplest 
living organism creates a set of preferential partitions of the 
world, converting interactions with their surrounding media into 
elementary norms or values, as we will explain more extensively 
below. And here is where the nature of living systems as autono-
mous agents, as inventors of worlds with meaning, becomes 
manifest»41) or in ‘constructivist’ terms, appealing to Kurt Gold-
stein’s idea that an organism, unlike a skeleton or a watch, is an 
meaning-producing entity. But these attempts to integrate ‘sense-
making’ or ‘world-making’ into the province of biology have 
nothing to do with appeals to «the interiority of selfhood» or a 
«reintroduction of the subject into biology». 
Selfhood or subjectivity is not a useful biological concept, 
any more than the soul was a useful medical concept (thus in the 
eighteenth century, the Montpellier vitalist physician Ménuret de 
Chambaud could seek to ‘eliminate’ soul from medical discourse, 
in an entry on «Death» in the Encyclopédie42). There is too much 
reliance here on an appeal to interiority, as if it was an unchal-
lengeable philosophical concept. As Jean-Marie Schaeffer says, 
«In phenomenology, the problematic of embodiment (corporéité) is 
part of an approach that continues to accept the epistemic privi-
lege of consciousness’s self-investigation as axiomatic»43. From a 
naturalistic standpoint,  
 
there are no intrinsically subjective or perspectival facts that are 
either the special objects of self-regarding attitudes or facts of 
“what it is like”. There are only states of subjects that both 
 
40 A. WEBER, F.J. VARELA, Life after Kant, cit., p. 117. 
41 K. RUIZ-MIRAZO, A. MORENO, Autonomy in evolution: from minimal to complex 
life, «Synthese», 185 (1), 2012, p. 28. 
42 J-J. MENURET DE CHAMBAUD, Mort, «Encyclopédie», vol. X, Briasson, Paris, 
1765, p. 718b. 
43 J.-M. SCHAEFFER, La fin de l’exception humaine, Gallimard, Paris, 2007, p. 118. 
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function in a particularly intimate way within those subjects and 
have the subjects themselves and their other states as inevitable 
referents. And that is all there is to “subjectivity”44. 
 
No one prevents philosophers from meditating on the inner 
life, subjectivity or interiority. Thinkers from Augustine to Paul 
Ricoeur have done so brilliantly45. But again, not only is selfhood 
or interiority not a recognized biological concept; it is unclear 
how it could play even a heuristic role therein (as opposed, e.g., 
to that of organization). To say it more positively, even if one is 
interested, not in living systems in general, but in ‘minded’ living 
systems, it remains the case that «things have a cognitive life 
because intelligence exists primarily as an enactive relation be-
tween and among people and things, not as a within-intracranial 
representation»46. We are better off thinking in terms of relations, 
systems and interaction than in terms of a substantival life-force, 
selfhood or interiority. But focusing on relations and networks 
should not mean leaving out the materiality: «system thinking does 
not imply forgetting about the material mechanisms that are crucial 
to trigger off a biological type of phenomenon/behavior; rather, it 
means putting the emphasis on the interactive processes that make 
it up, that is, on the dynamic organization in which biomolecules 
(or, rather, their precursors) actually get integrated»47. 
 
 
44 W.G. LYCAN, What is the ‘Subjectivity’ of the Mental? Philosophical Perspectives 4: 
Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind, 1990, p. 126. 
45 For a critique, see C.T. WOLFE, Éléments pour une théorie matérialiste du soi, in F. 
Pépin, ed., La Circulation entre les savoirs au siècle des Lumières, Hermann, Paris, 
2011, pp. 123-149. 
46 L. MALAFOURIS, C. RENFREW (eds.), The cognitive life of things: recasting the 
boundaries of the mind, McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publica-
tions, Cambridge, 2008, Introduction, p. 4. One can also be more charitable to 
Thompson’s enactivism, as he is not always unhappily insisting on a founda-
tional interiority (what some would call ‘internalism’); he also describes living  
interiority as «compris[ing] the self-production of an inside that specifies an 
outside to which that inside is constitutively and normatively related» (E. 
THOMPSON, Mind in life, cit., p. 225). 
47 K. RUIZ-MIRAZO, A. MORENO Basic Autonomy as a Fundamental Step in the 
Synthesis of Life. Artificial Life, 10, 2004, p. 238. 
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IV. In sum, holism/organicism can succumb to two major 
kinds of temptation: it can present itself as an empirical theory, 
providing the key empirical characteristics of organisms, over and 
against the rest of the natural world. Or, conversely, there is what 
one might call the transcendental problem, in the sense of a 
transcendentalizing of organism, or the flesh, or embodiment. 
One can indeed be reluctant to conceive of the organism in 
purely computational terms without invoking a mysticism of the 
flesh (from Merleau-Ponty’s appeals to transubstantiation in 
seeking to highlight what is unique in the sensation of an embod-
ied being48 to Thompson’s denial that «life is physical in the 
materialist sense»). Here, a third problem emerges: the addiction 
to formalisms at the expense of materiality. 
Faced with certain holistic excesses, I am not, to repeat, ad-
vocating the extreme prudence of instrumentalism, in which the 
moral when it comes to the material realization of biological 
systems might be ‘handsome is as handsome does’. Contempo-
rary holists are often still potentially beholden to a certain kind of 
vitalism or «biochauvinism»49; but when, out of extreme caution, 
they reduce their claims to mere heuristics, conversely, they risk 
losing sight of a certain kind of organizational «thickness», a «vital 
materiality» in Wheeler’s terms50; he opposes vital to implementa-
tional materiality, without really fleshing out the distinction, so to 
speak, but I assume it is similar to what an earlier, perhaps the 
first theorist of vital materiality, Denis Diderot, expressed in a 
 
48 «Just as the sacrament not only symbolizes … an operation of Grace, but is 
also the real presence of God … in the same way the sensible has not only a 
motor and vital significance but is nothing other than a way of being in the 
world that our body takes over […] sensation is literally a communion» (M. 
MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, Paris, 1945, p. 245). 
49 Again, this is not an essay in the historical epistemology of organisms, or a 
suggestion in how to rethink our presuppositions about vitalism, e.g. by 
revisiting its history. For some efforts in this direction, see C.T. WOLFE, From 
substantival to functional vitalism and beyond, or from Stahlian animas to Canguilhemian 
attitudes. Eidos, 14, 2011, pp. 212-235; S. NORMANDIN, C.T. WOLFE (eds.), 
Vitalism and the scientific image in post-Enlightenment life science, 1800-2010, Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2013. 
50 M. WHEELER, Mind, things and materiality, in L. MALAFOURIS, C. RENFREW 
(eds.), The cognitive life of things, pp. 29-37. 
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nice metaphor: «What a difference there is, between a sensing, 
living watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper watch!»51.  
If there was only implementational materiality, (i) we would 
fail to grasp any meaningful difference between a living watch 
and a silver or copper watch – and please note, this difference 
need not be justified in terms of a vital force, an entelechy, an élan 
vital, a centralizing soul or self, an irreducible intentionality or 
first-personness52 – and (ii) we would lapse into a kind of lazy 
multiple realizability position53 which disregards the material in 
which a system is realized, of the sort classically stated by Varela 
and later, Robert Rosen. Here is Varela: 
 
We are thus saying that what defines a machine’s organization is 
relations, and hence that the organization of a machine has no 
connection with materiality, that is, with the properties of the 
components that define them as physical entities. In the organiza-
tion of a machine, materiality is implied but does not enter per se.54 
 
Using much the same language, Rosen describes his ap-
proach as «relational», which we might think of as congenial to 
the study of specific biological forms of organization, but no: he 
adds that the relational approach aims to «throw away the matter 
and keep the underlying organization»55. This is like the central 
dogma of functionalism, i.e., multiple realizability, by virtue of 
which the materiality of systems is held to be irrelevant: as ex-
pressed classically by the arch-functionalist Hilary Putnam, «we 
 
51 D. DIDEROT, Éléments de physiologie, in Œuvres complètes, dir. H. Dieckmann, J. 
Proust, J. Varloot, Éditions Hermann, Paris, 1975-, XVII, p. 335. 
52 Contra the Varela first-person business (e.g. F.J. VARELA, J. SHEAR, First-
person methodologies: why, when and how, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2-3) 
1999, pp. 1-14). 
53 See the excellent history and analysis of multiple realizability arguments in J. 
BICKLE, Multiple Realizability, in E. ZALTA (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/, 1998; updated 2013. 
54 F.J. VARELA, Principles of Biological Autonomy, Elsevier North Holland, New 
York, 1979, p. 9, cit. in W. BECHETEL, Biological mechanisms, cit., p. 294. To be 
fair, in context Varela is not calling for multiple realizability, but it is not clear 
why or how he is not. 
55 R. ROSEN, Life Itself, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 119; cf. 
«throwing away the physics and keeping the underlying organization» (p. 280). 
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could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn’t matter»56. 
To conclude, there is something endearing about vitalist 
claims especially when they don’t invoke or rely on a foundational 
subjectivity, including because they don’t revert to explaining 
biological systems (embodied agents) in fully systemic, formalized 
terms. So is a small amount of biochauvinism acceptable, or even 
desirable? If it means the effort to grasp the kind of vital material-
ity characteristic of biological systems – their organization, in the 
language of Moreno, and also Bechtel, who, like Scott Turner, 
invokes Claude Bernard as an important predecessor of this 
view57. Recall that for Bernard, «In order to study the phenomena 
pertaining to living beings and discover the laws that govern 
them, it is not necessary to know the essence of life itself»58. We 
could enlist Bernard in support of the view that an investigation 
of vital materiality need not transcendentalize Life or organism. 
But is this materiality «substance» or «organization»? It is not 
quite a biochauvinism, or very weakly, because it does not posit a 
vital substance, a foundational interiority or an absolute set of 
criteria for Life: recall von Bertalanffy’s observation, «There is no 
“living substance” because the characteristic of life is the organi-
zation of substances»59. However, as I’ve said earlier, a focus on 
organization and relations need not imply that we sacrifice its 
materiality in favour of ‘Swiss cheese’ multiple realizability. A 
biochauvinism implies a degree of ontological commitment (what 
I termed a «weakly ontological» view of organism in my earlier 
reflection on the topic60). A tangibility, implicit in what I above 
 
56 H. PUTNAM, Philosophy and our Mental Life, in Putnam, Mind, Language, and 
Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1975, p. 291. 
57 J. S. TURNER, cit., chapter 2 (on Bernard machines); idem, Homeostasis and the 
forgotten vitalist roots of adaptation, in S. NORMANDIN, C.T. WOLFE (eds.), Vitalism 
and the scientific image, cit. 
58 C. BERNARD, Histoire de l’expérimentation physiologique – l’art d’expérimenter sur les 
êtres vivants, Revue des cours scientifiques de la France et de l’étranger, 6e 
année, Germer Baillière, Paris, 1869, p. 194. 
59 L.V. BERTALLANFY, Modern theories of development, trans. J.H. Woodger, 
Oxford University Press, H. Milford, London, 1933, p. 48. 
60 C.T. WOLFE, Do organisms have an ontological status?, cit. 
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pointed to – that most materialists can accept a degree of embod-
iment (a.k.a. biochauvinism), granting that facts about bodies can 
act as ʻmajor constraintsʼ on facts about minds. Yet this tangibil-
ity, this embodiment appeal to no foundational interiority, no 
special inner life. 
My suggestion then is that it should be possible to articulate 
a concept of biological holism or organicism (whether it is locat-
ed in systems biology, theoretical biology, evolutionary biology or 
a philosophical reconstruction of several of these) which dispens-
es with the first-person obsession or the transubstantiation-
friendly invocation of an ontology of the body as corps propre, 
although this is not the same as Clark’s, Wheeler’s or Malafouris’ 
attention to vital materiality. Such a view is neither an empirical, 
laundry list ‘biochauvinism’ nor a metaphysical ‘vitalism’. 
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